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The debate over linking trade and worker 
rights is often a dialogue of the deaf, with 
advocates on either side paying little atten-
tion to the scope for positive synergies be-
tween labor standards, development, and 
globalization. Instead, each side views the 
other as promoting positions that will, in-
tentionally or not, impoverish poor people 
in  poor  countries.  Opponents  of  global 
labor standards fear that these standards 
will undermine developing countries’ com-
parative  advantage  in  low-wage  goods 
or  be  abused  for  protectionist  purposes, 
thereby denying workers jobs. Standards 
advocates  argue  that  failure  to  include 
labor  standards  in  trade  agreements  in-
creases inequality and leads to a race to 
the bottom for workers worldwide. 
Both  sides  in  the  standards  debate 
have some things right but others wrong 
(Elliott and Freeman 2003). Globalization 
enthusiasts are right that increased trade 
can  contribute  to  growth  and  that  the 
jobs global engagement creates are gener-
ally better than those in agriculture or the 
informal  sector.  But  they  downplay  the 
increased  income  inequality  that  some-
times accompanies globalization, the dis-
proportionate influence that multinational 
corporations  have  had  on  international 
trade negotiations, and the possibilities for 
directly improving conditions for workers 
in less developed countries without risking 
economic growth. Worker rights advocates 
are right that global labor standards can 
spread the benefits of globalization more 
broadly,  discourage  the  worst  abuses  of 
workers, and increase public support for 
trade  agreements.  But  they  undervalue 
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developing-country  exports  to  enable  poor  people 
to move from agriculture and the informal sector to 
more productive jobs.
Since  2001,  labor  standards  have  become  a 
common feature in US bilateral trade agreements, 
but  the  debate  rages  unabated  over  the  recently 
concluded Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA). Its fate in the US Congress is uncertain 
because of a combination of protectionist interests 
on both sides of the aisle and Democratic concerns 
that the labor provisions are not strong enough.
The  first  half  of  this  policy  brief  explores  the 
potential  positive  synergies  between  globalization, 
development,  and  labor  standards.  It  argues  that 
certain core labor standards can be applied globally 
and that doing so would be good for development. 
It  then  reviews  the  evidence  on  comparative  and 
competitive  advantage,  showing  that  higher  labor 
standards do not necessarily raise costs and that 
globalization is not leading to a worldwide race to 
the bottom in labor standards. At the same time, 
employers  and  some  developing-country  govern-
ments ignore labor standards for business and po-
litical reasons, which may set off a race to the bot-
tom from the bottom in certain sectors, suggesting a 
limited role for addressing trade-related violations 
of core labor standards in trade agreements.
Far more is needed, of course, to ensure that 
labor standards and globalization progress together. 
As discussed in detail in Elliott and Freeman (2003), 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) should 
retain the central role in promoting and enforcing 
labor standards and should be strengthened to do 
that job effectively. In addition, the business com-
munity and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
can expand the role of the “market for standards,” 
by providing consumers the information they need 
to choose products made under decent conditions.
The  second  half  of  the  policy  brief  examines 
these issues in the context of the free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) the United States Trade Representa-
tive  (USTR)  has  concluded  and  is  pursuing.  The 
brief concludes by recommending ways of improv-
ing the labor provisions in the CAFTA to bolster the 
probability of its ratification.1
International Labor Standards, Globalization, 
and Development
Ensuring  that  labor  standards,  globalization, 
and development are mutually reinforcing depends 
on the following key distinctions:
• core versus cash standards
• universal versus uniform standards
• competitive versus comparative advantage
• lack of capacity versus lack of political will
Extensive  research  and  analysis  suggest  that 
certain  core  standards  can  be  applied  universally 
without harming developing countries’ comparative 
advantage  in  labor-intensive  products.  But  some 
evidence also suggests that concerns about short-
run competitiveness in some sectors or firms can 
undermine the political will to effectively implement 
standards.
Universal Core Labor Standards
Some  labor  standards—for  example,  wages  and 
health  and  safety  regulations—clearly  must  vary 
with the level of development and local living stan-
dards in countries. Such “cash standards,” if set too 
high, can raise labor costs beyond what productivity 
justifies and can decrease employment and exports. 
Core labor standards, however, are framework stan-
dards that are comparable to the rules that protect 
property rights and freedom of transactions in prod-
uct markets, rules widely viewed as necessary for 
market economies to operate efficiently.
In 1998, more than 170 ILO members identi-
fied  four  standards  as  “fundamental  principles 
and  rights  at  work”  that  all  countries  should 
promote,  regardless  of  their  level  of  development. 
These core standards—freedom of association and 
the right to organize and bargain collectively, the 
abolition  of  forced  labor,  the  elimination  of  child 
labor,  and  nondiscrimination  in  employment—
strengthen markets because they protect workers’ 
rights to choose whether and under what conditions 
to  work.  But  they  are  also  based  on  democratic 
The International Labor Organization should 
retain the central role in promoting and 
enforcing labor standards and should be 
strengthened to do that job effectively.
1 The implications of these FTAs for development and for the 
multilateral trade system are important but are not addressed 
here.  For discussion of some of these issues, see Elliott (2003) 
and Schott (2004).Number PB04-2 March 2004 3
principles and are recognized as fundamental rights 
to which all workers are entitled.
Moreover,  the  global  application  of  these  core 
standards does not mean forcing developing coun-
tries to adopt rich-country standards. Just as uni-
versality of property rights and freedom of market 
transactions does not imply identical laws or insti-
tutions among countries, universality of core labor 
standards does not imply uniformity in the details of 
the protections or in the institutions that implement 
them. Even the legally binding ILO conventions that 
define  the  core  standards  leave  substantial  room 
for national differences—for example, they do not 
prescribe any particular set of industrial relations 
institutions.
No  one  questions  the  need  to  abolish  forced 
labor, and the goals of ending child labor, as the 
ILO defines it, and discrimination are also broadly 
shared.2 The only reference to labor standards in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
is Article XX(e), which allows countries to ban im-
ports of products made with prison labor. The ex-
pected benefits of tackling child labor and discrimi-
nation are clear from the priority they are given in 
the Millennium Development Goals. The UN target 
of  achieving  universal  primary  school  enrollment 
cannot be achieved without addressing child labor. 
In support of these joint goals, the ILO released a 
report estimating that the global benefits of moving 
children from work to school, while also improving 
educational quality and offsetting some of the lost 
family  income,  might  be  seven  times  higher  than 
the costs (ILO 2004, 4). Quantifying the costs and 
benefits  of  eliminating  gender  discrimination  is 
more difficult, but a World Bank (2001) study docu-
ments extensive benefits from empowering women, 
including better health and well-being for women, 
children, and men; higher overall productivity and 
economic  growth;  and  better  governance.  These 
goals will not be achieved if women face widespread 
discrimination in the workplace.3
The goal of achieving freedom of association and 
the  right  to  collective  bargaining  is  more  contro-
versial. Governments and employers often resist it 
because freedom to form unions and negotiate over 
work  conditions  increases  the  power  of  workers 
relative to the state or capital. But giving workers a 
mechanism for raising and negotiating about work-
place problems lays the foundation for addressing 
other  labor  standards,  particularly  in  developing 
countries where governments lack the resources to 
enforce labor laws. Union rights are also a means 
of ensuring more equitable distribution of the gains 
from globalization (Freeman and Medoff 1984).
The World Bank recently published a survey of 
more than 1,000 studies on the economic effects of 
unions, which concluded that there is “little system-
atic  difference  in  economic  performance  between 
countries that enforce [union rights] and countries 
that do not” (Aidt and Tzannatos 2002, 4). The sur-
vey shows that what unions do varies depending on 
local institutional and legal arrangements and the 
competitive environment in which they operate. In 
general, it finds that estimates of the economywide 
welfare  losses  from  union  wage  premia  are  small 
and that high union density reduces earnings in-
equality (Aidt and Tzannatos 2002, 7–8, 11).4
Some observers, while not opposing freedom of 
association in principle, regard unions in developing 
countries  as  elitist,  corrupt,  rent-seeking  institu-
tions that reduce a country’s growth prospects and 
so oppose unions in practice. Unions fit that image 
usually in countries where politicians and firms are 
also  elitist,  corrupt,  and  rent-seeking.  In  others, 
unions  are  a  force  for  democracy  and  protection 
of  property  rights,  without  which  workers  would 
lose their jobs. Since the late 1990s, Zimbabwe’s 
trade unions have been the main opposition to the 
Mugabe dictatorship and its land seizures. Unions 
were also a leading force in the campaign against 
apartheid  in  South  Africa.  The  Solidarity  trade 
union was a major force in toppling the communist 
leadership in Poland in the 1980s. Where unions 
do fit the caricature, the solution is the same as for 
firms and politicians: exposure to competition and 
2 The ILO definition of child labor does not encompass all 
economic activity but only work that endangers the health of 
children or interferes with their ability to go to school (up to a 
minimum age of 15 or 16).  In 1999, the ILO further delineated 
priorities in this area by adopting a new convention calling for 
immediate action against the “worst forms of child labor.”
3 Although the UN goals focus on gender, ILO convention 111 
also covers discrimination based on race, color, religion, politi-
cal opinion, national extraction, and social origin.  The ILO also 
has specialized conventions addressing discrimination against 
or other special problems of migrant workers and indigenous 
peoples.
Labor ministry officials sometimes concede 
in private that foreign investors threaten to 
go elsewhere if they must deal with unions. 
4 See also World Bank (1995) and Freeman (1993).  The evi-
dence from these studies underscores the fact that adherence to 
core labor standards, in particular freedom of association, does 
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democratic reforms to ensure that they are account-
able to their members.
In sum, the core labor standards support sus-
tainable  and  broadly  shared  political,  social,  and 
economic  development.  Moreover,  since  transpar-
ency,  democratic  accountability,  and  competition 
are central goals of globalization enthusiasts, their 
goals and those of labor standards proponents are 
consistent and mutually reinforcing.
Evidence on Comparative and Competitive 
Advantage
Relative  endowments  of  land,  labor,  human  and 
physical  capital,  and  other  factors  of  production 
determine the comparative advantage of countries. 
Developing countries usually have abundant labor 
and therefore a comparative advantage in low-wage, 
labor-intensive activities. Whether labor standards 
could, in theory, affect this comparative advantage 
depends on the standard in question and also on 
the environment in which they are applied. In prac-
tice, the evidence suggests that the costs associated 
with implementing the core labor standards would 
not be so great as to undermine overall comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive activities.
In the short run, forced labor and child labor 
increase the supply of labor and could be used to 
increase  low-wage  exports,  but  both  are  uncom-
mon in export industries (ILO 2001, 2002). Thus, 
taking action against them would have little impact 
on  international  competitive  advantage.  Indeed, 
taking children out of factories and enrolling them 
in schools could even increase productivity in the 
longer run by expanding human capital.
The effects of efforts to combat discrimination 
and promote freedom of association are less certain 
a priori. For example, discrimination in the export 
sector lowers the potential labor supply, raises the 
cost of labor, and reduces exports. In that situation, 
raising  standards  could  help  comparative  advan-
tage. But in many developing countries, discrimi-
nation discourages employment of female workers 
outside of less-skilled work in low-wage industries 
such as clothing, footwear, and toys. This increases 
the supply of female workers in those industries, 
which could lower prices and increase production 
and exports of those goods relative to what would 
happen otherwise. Whether enforcing nondiscrimi-
nation standards would affect short-run competi-
tiveness  in  certain  sectors  depends  on  available 
alternatives and the productivity effects of treating 
all groups equally. But either way, promoting non-
discrimination would contribute to achieving overall 
development objectives and would not undo overall 
comparative advantage.
The economic effects of freedom of association 
and  bargaining  rights  are  also  contingent  on  the 
sector and the environment in which they are exer-
cised. As noted in the World Bank study cited earli-
er, the labor-cost effects depend on the net result of 
potential increases in wages and productivity. More-
over, stiff competition in export markets will tend to 
constrain the “monopoly face” of unions but still al-
low the “voice face” to work on improving conditions 
with low immediate costs for the employer—verbal 
and physical abuse, fire safety measures, bathroom 
breaks, and other health and safety measures (Free-
man and Medoff 1984).
In general, existing evidence does not suggest 
that globalization is leading generally to a race to 
the bottom, and there is no evidence that countries 
with lower labor standards attract more foreign di-
rect investment or grow faster. There is evidence, 
mostly  anecdotal,  that  many  developing-country 
governments,  employers,  and  multinational  buy-
ers perceive there are costs associated with higher 
standards and try to gain competitive advantage by 
ignoring labor and other laws. Such practices, how-
ever, are usually associated with low productivity, 
undermine the rule of law, and do not contribute to 
development in the long run.
Nevertheless, labor ministry officials sometimes 
concede in private that foreign investors threaten 
to go elsewhere if they must deal with unions. Fac-
tory managers complain that foreign buyers often 
demand they follow a corporate code of conduct and 
then  place  an  order  that  cannot  possibly  be  met 
without forcing workers to stay on the job 14 to 16 
hours a day, seven days a week without overtime 
pay.  Also,  some  theoretical  and  empirical  cross-
country research, albeit not robust, suggests that 
core labor standards and competitiveness could be 
negatively correlated in some sectors.5 That is, there 
5 This research is summarized in Elliott and Freeman (2003, 
chapter 1) and UK Department for International Development 
(2003, 13).
Poverty, lack of resources, and weak 
governmental capacity are not the only 
reasons why developing countries do not 
effectively enforce labor standards. Some 
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could be a race to the bottom from the bottom among 
low-wage countries competing in highly price com-
petitive, low-skill, and geographically mobile sectors 
such as clothing and footwear.
A few countries make no pretense about this. 
Pakistan,  Bangladesh,  and  a  few  other  countries 
explicitly  restrict  core  labor  standards  in  export 
processing  zones  (EPZs)—usually  freedom  of  as-
sociation  and  bargaining  rights—with  the  stated 
goal of attracting foreign investment and increasing 
exports. In many more countries, union organizers 
are blacklisted by firms or denied access to EPZs 
that are usually surrounded by high walls or fences. 
Workers in export firms are often fired with impu-
nity for trying to organize unions, even when local 
law prohibits this practice.
Detailed World Bank research on the garment 
sector in Bangladesh also shows that young women 
are overrepresented in sewing jobs and underrepre-
sented in more-skilled jobs in apparel factories and 
in all other sectors of the economy. Manufacturers 
there reportedly prefer to employ women in sewing 
jobs because they are more docile, less likely to join 
unions, and more likely to accept low wages, in part 
due to discrimination in other sectors (Paul-Majum-
der and Begum 2000). Bangladesh is hardly alone 
in these practices.
In other words, poverty, lack of resources, and 
weak governmental capacity are not the only rea-
sons why developing countries do not effectively en-
force labor standards. Some also lack the political 
will to do so, which suggests the need for a multifac-
eted approach to promote compliance. Meaningful 
progress will be most likely in countries that want to 
improve implementation of labor standards and are 
provided financial and technical assistance to do so, 
but sticks are also sometimes necessary.
The ILO is the leading international agency on 
these issues, and in addition to providing technical 
assistance to labor ministries and other agencies, 
unions, and employer groups, it has two other tools 
for  improving  working  conditions.  First,  it  super-
vises compliance with global labor conventions and 
publicizes violations of standards to shame coun-
tries to improve matters. Second, and contrary to 
conventional wisdom, it has an enforcement mecha-
nism, one that it had not used until the 1990s. More 
vigorous enforcement action by the ILO requires not 
sharper  teeth  but  political  will  on  the  part  of  its 
members. In addition to official assistance, private-
sector initiatives, including independent monitoring 
and verification of codes of conduct, can be an im-
portant complement to fill gaps while local capacity 
is being strengthened.
But  the  evidence  that  some  countries  repress 
labor standards or look the other way to promote 
trade  or  investment  suggests  that  the  interna-
tional community needs to retain the stick of trade 
sanctions to address egregious violations that are 
trade-related and not amenable to remedy by other 
means.  Incorporating  measures  against  violations 
in  trade  agreements  would  also  help  build  sup-
port  among  critics  who  believe  these  agreements 
are biased in favor of corporate interests. Thus far, 
labor standards have been included in only a few 
US bilateral trade agreements. The jury is still out 
on whether the carrots and sticks included in these 
agreements are more than window dressing.
Congressional Politics and Trade Agreements
Respect for worker rights has been a condition 
of  US  unilateral  trade  preference  programs  since 
1984, but it became an issue in reciprocal trade ne-
gotiations only with the decision to pursue a trade 
agreement  with  Mexico  in  the  early  1990s.  After 
eight years of debate over whether and how to incor-
porate labor and environmental standards in trade 
agreements, Congress finally passed the Trade Act 
of 2002, which included “trade promotion author-
ity” (TPA) allowing the president to negotiate trade 
agreements that Congress must vote up or down, 
without amendment. Even with a compromise that 
allows limited labor and environmental issues to be 
addressed in trade agreements, however, the House 
of Representatives sent the initial bill to the Senate 
by one vote and ultimately approved the conference 
report by just a three-vote margin.
Stymied by the absence of TPA in the 1990s and 
by the collective opposition of developing countries 
in  multilateral  and  regional  forums,  the  United 
States has since 2000 negotiated and approved only 
three FTAs incorporating labor standards. But they 
were  relatively  minor  agreements  with  small,  far-
away countries with high standards, good working 
conditions, and few sensitive exports: Jordan, Sin-
gapore, and Chile. Ratification of the CAFTA—the 
Globalization is not leading to a worldwide 
race to the bottom for workers, but greater 
respect for the core labor standards could 
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agreement with five Central American countries—is 
more likely to resemble the partisan battles that ac-
companied the TPA debate.
The five—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua (with the Dominican Re-
public to be added in coming weeks)—export labor-
intensive  apparel  and  sensitive  agricultural  prod-
ucts and, outside Costa Rica, have working condi-
tions that are worse and labor standards that are, 
in practice, lower than other recent FTA partners. 
Key Democrats in the House argue that the labor 
language  incorporated  in  previous  agreements  is 
not adequate in this case and have vowed to defeat 
the agreement. They may be able to do so because 
many Republican congressmen who voted for free 
trade bills in the past represent constituencies that 
compete with Central American exports.
It  now  seems  clear  that  the  TPA  compromise 
glossed over fundamental political differences and 
did not resolve the issue of how to address labor 
standards in trade agreements. The labor chapter in 
the Chile and Singapore FTAs and CAFTA calls on 
parties to the agreement to enforce their own laws 
but does not require that those laws be consistent 
with  international  standards.  These  agreements 
reaffirm each party’s commitment to the core labor 
standards  contained  in  the  ILO’s  “Declaration  on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” and 
also “recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage 
trade or investment by weakening or reducing the 
protections  afforded  in  domestic  labor  laws.”  But 
the only labor provision that is subject to dispute 
settlement under these agreements is a failure to 
“effectively enforce” each party’s own labor laws—all 
of them, not just the core standards. And even that 
provision excludes weak enforcement that is due to 
“a reasonable exercise of . . . discretion [with respect 
to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and com-
pliance matters], or results from a bona fide deci-
sion regarding the allocation of resources.”
The key criticism of this approach is that it does 
not include adherence to core labor standards as an 
enforceable obligation of these agreements. The gap 
between developing-country labor laws and the core 
standards is often less than thought because coun-
tries that are at least formally democratic, as is true 
of Central America, generally have labor laws that 
are  close  to  fulfilling—on  paper—the  obligations 
of the core ILO conventions. Longer-standing and 
more stable democracies, like Costa Rica, generally 
do better than those with weak and nascent democ-
racies, such as El Salvador. But no country’s laws 
are perfect (including the United States), and incen-
tives for further improvements in the core standards 
are desirable.6
At  the  same  time,  many  developing  countries 
have labor laws that are overly rigid, that encourage 
forms  of  employment—part-time  and  short-term 
contracts—that are generally excluded from formal 
legal protections, and that transfer a greater bur-
den of economic uncertainty to workers. Workers 
would generally do better in a system that provides 
robust protection for the core labor standards and 
a stronger safety net and training programs for un-
employed and low-skilled workers, while making it 
easier to hire and fire workers.
Instead of encouraging such reforms, the “en-
force-your-own-laws” standard could have the op-
posite effect. It could discourage improvements in 
the  core  labor  standards  if  partner  countries  are 
not able to enforce existing laws and fear being sub-
jected to sanctions. But it could also inhibit needed 
reforms in other areas because of the language dis-
couraging the weakening of laws to attract invest-
ment or promote exports.7 Many developing-country 
partners, including those in Central America, may 
also be more concerned about the possibility of en-
forcement  actions  under  this  standard,  given  the 
well-known problems in implementing labor stan-
dards,  especially  with  respect  to  legal  wage  pay-
ments and excessive hours.
Meaningful progress will be most likely 
in countries that want to improve 
implementation of labor standards and are 
provided financial and technical assistance 
to do so, but sticks are also sometimes 
necessary. 
6 In 2000, Human Rights Watch released a report document-
ing deficiencies in US labor law that undermine freedom of 
association.  In addition, while El Salvador is the only one of 
the five Central American nations not to have ratified all eight 
core conventions (87 and 98 on freedom of association and 
bargaining rights are unsigned), the United States has ratified 
only two—105 on forced labor and 182 on the worst forms of 
child labor.  The “enforce-your-own-laws” standard will be more 
problematic if the administration goes forward with its proposal 
for an FTA with the Middle East, where several countries ban 
trade unions.
7 Even though this provision refers to “internationally recog-
nized” worker rights, the definition is a unilateral American one 
that predates and is inconsistent with the 1998 ILO consensus.  
The US definition includes three of the four ILO standards, but 
it excludes discrimination and includes minimum conditions of 
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Improving CAFTA’s Prospects
Despite the problems, changes to the enforce-
ment  provisions  in  the  CAFTA  labor  chapter  are 
unlikely.8 Therefore, vigorous action on other fronts 
is  needed  to  encourage  reforms  and  bolster  the 
prospects  for  ratification.  Promises  to  implement 
a cooperation program to promote labor standards 
compliance  will  be  insufficient  because  the  weak 
implementation  of  the  labor  and  environmental 
side agreements to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement has disillusioned standards proponents. 
More  recently,  action,  or  in  some  cases  inaction, 
by governments in the United States and Central 
America has reinforced this skepticism.
The  Bush  administration’s  repeated  efforts  to 
shrink the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs, which funds technical 
assistance on labor standards, has called into ques-
tion the administration’s commitment to a “paral-
lel track” for labor standards (box 1). USTR Robert 
Zoellick announced in October 2003 that the United 
States would provide nearly $7 million in technical 
assistance over four years to improve labor stan-
dards  in  Central  America.  But  this  seems  incon-
sistent  with  the  administration’s  request  for  $12 
million for the international bureau for fiscal 2004, 
which is not enough even to cover operating costs.
Other  elements  of  the  administration’s  an-
nounced  plans  for  promoting  labor  standards  in 
Central America do not help its credibility on these 
issues either. First, in addition to cutting the overall 
budget, the Bush administration has also reduced 
US budgetary support for the ILO. The USTR fact 
sheet  on  CAFTA  lists  “working  with  ILO”  as  the 
second  part  of  its  three-part  strategy  for  improv-
ing working conditions in the region. But the DOL 
awarded the $6.75 million for technical assistance 
to  the  region  to  a  Costa  Rican–based  NGO  that 
works on democracy but appears to have little ex-
perience  with  labor  issues  (www.funpadem.com). 
Involving  the  ILO  would  have  brought  far  greater 
expertise and credibility to the effort.
Box 1. Is the Bush administration committed to promoting labor standards?
The last two years of the Clinton administration saw the budget for promotion of international labor stan-
dards, especially child labor, increase sharply. Since entering office, the Bush administration has repeatedly 
tried to cut this budget (see table). So far, Congress has restored most of the cuts, but most of the funds 
are increasingly for child labor programs. Support for ILO technical assistance outside the special program 
for eliminating child labor has largely disappeared. By fiscal 2004, $82 million of the roughly $100 million 
in technical assistance funds was earmarked for reducing child labor, and only $2.5 million was slated for 
bilateral and multilateral technical assistance to improve labor standards compliance in other areas; the 
remaining $15 million was for AIDS at work programs and DOL labor standards monitoring. In fiscal 2003, 
by contrast, $20 million had been provided for multilateral and $17 million for bilateral technical assistance 
programs.
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Source: Various official White House budget documents.
8 For an alternative approach based on GATT Article XX(e), 
which allows countries to ban the import of products made with 
prison labor, see Elliott and Freeman (2003).
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Second,  with  respect  to  encouraging  private-
sector efforts to improve standards compliance, ad-
ministration fact sheets refer only to the Worldwide 
Responsible  Apparel  Production  (WRAP)  program, 
an industry-sponsored initiative that is regarded as 
the weakest and least transparent of several private 
code  monitoring  projects.  Overcoming  suspicions 
about  the  depth  of  the  administration’s  commit-
ment to labor standards requires, at a minimum, 
releasing a detailed workplan and budget for it at 
the same time that implementing legislation for the 
trade agreement is introduced.
Selected labor law and institutional reforms by 
governments  in  the  region  and  a  more  concerted 
private-sector effort to expand and strengthen in-
dependent, external monitoring of codes of conduct 
are also needed to ensure progress. The recent ILO 
report on labor laws in the region found problems 
that should be rectified, but the real problem is with 
the  implementation  and  enforcement  of  existing 
laws. Early action to approve labor law reforms in 
key areas would also signal that the governments 
in the region have the political will to address these 
issues. But governments and capacity-building ef-
forts  should  emphasize  strengthening  institutions 
needed to ensure that workers are able to exercise 
the rights that the law gives them.
As part of the process of restoring democracy 
after the civil wars of the 1980s, El Salvador, Gua-
temala, and Nicaragua reformed their labor laws, 
often with help from the ILO and sometimes under 
pressure from US threats to withdraw benefits under 
the Generalized System of Preferences because of a 
failure to meet worker rights conditions. But prob-
lems remain in Honduras and, to a lesser degree, 
in Costa Rica, particularly in the area of freedom 
of association. Costa Rica has responded to criti-
cisms from ILO experts by reforming its treatment 
of  employee  “solidarity  associations”  so  that  they 
are  not  given  an  advantage  vis-à-vis  unions.  But 
like all the countries in Central America (and many 
elsewhere), Costa Rica has nationality requirements 
for union leaders, a clear violation of ILO conven-
tions and a potentially serious problem where there 
are large numbers of migrant workers. Most of the 
countries in the region also have overly burdensome 
registration requirements for unions and do not do 
enough to protect workers from antiunion discrimi-
nation.  Along  with  easing  nationality  restrictions 
and registration requirements, further legal reforms 
should be priorities, including explicitly prohibiting 
employers using and circulating blacklists of union 
organizers and providing for prompt reinstatement 
of workers illegally dismissed for union activities.
But labor law reforms are only the first step, and 
institution  building  is  at  least  as  important.  The 
CAFTA labor chapter rightly emphasizes the need 
for due process and public awareness in implement-
ing laws effectively. The annex on labor cooperation 
and  capacity  building  also  lists  as  priorities  im-
proved  labor  administration,  including  tribunals, 
improved  labor  inspection  systems,  and  develop-
ment of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
These are all worthy of support, but resource con-
straints are likely to limit the progress that can be 
made in the short run. The USTR documents have 
few specific ideas on how to achieve these goals and 
even less discussion on funding.
Although  the  administration  recently  notified 
Congress  of  its  intent  to  sign  the  CAFTA,  it  still 
seems unlikely to submit the agreement for ratifica-
tion in an election year. Although the governments 
of  the  Central  American  countries  would  like  the 
agreement ratified as soon as possible, they could 
fruitfully use any delay to rectify legal deficiencies 
so  that  concrete  progress  can  be  demonstrated 
when  the  implementing  legislation  does  come  up 
for a vote. In addition, to demonstrate seriousness 
of purpose, it would be useful to launch programs 
that focus on empowering workers to protect their 
rights themselves. Mechanisms that allow workers 
to pursue complaints outside the normal inspection 
process,  including  through  unions  and  collective 
bargaining  agreements,  are  essential.  Among  the 
experiments tried in Central America and elsewhere 
that might be worth developing:
• the creation of fee-free hotlines for workers to 
bring complaints to the attention of authorities, 
as was reportedly done in Costa Rica with US 
funding;
•  the  use  of  official  or  unofficial  ombudsmen 
to investigate complaints, a tool effectively em-
Trade agreements can play a role by 
focusing attention on labor issues and by 
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ployed on an ad hoc basis by the Fair Labor As-
sociation (FLA);9 and
•  development  of  independent  and  impartial 
conciliation and arbitration mechanisms.
Cambodia has created a national arbitration council 
with ILO advice and US funding. But some groups 
are also exploring proposals to expand private ca-
pacity to conduct and encourage the use of media-
tion and arbitration to resolve labor disputes (Zack 
2003).
It is notable, however, that these projects can 
only be effective if workers know their rights. The 
CAFTA  labor  chapter  emphasizes  the  need  to  in-
crease public awareness of labor laws and institu-
tions, but again, there are no specific proposals on 
how to do this. Costa Rican officials claim that they 
have succeeded in increasing awareness and that 
Costa  Rican  workers  regularly  contact  the  labor 
ministry to get information about their rights and 
to raise problems. The ministry provides informa-
tion for workers on its website, advertises how to 
get  help  on  television  and  radio,  and  has  kiosks 
throughout the country with brochures and other 
information for workers. Costa Rica ought to share 
lessons from this experience with its neighbors.10
Multistakeholder  code  monitoring  initiatives, 
such  as  those  the  FLA  and  Social  Accountability 
International  (SAI)  operate,  can  also  be  useful  in 
supplementing  inadequate  official  capacity.  The 
FLA works primarily with the apparel and footwear 
sectors, but SAI certification is available to plants 
in a variety of manufacturing and a few service sec-
tors. SAI is also conducting pilot projects to explore 
adaptation of its SA8000 standard to small enter-
prises in the agricultural sector, and Chiquita re-
cently succeeded in getting certification for all of its 
banana operations in Costa Rica. Currently, more 
apparel  plants  in  Central  America  are  reportedly 
monitored under the WRAP initiative than by FLA or 
SAI. But this is difficult to verify because WRAP does 
not publish a list of certified factories. Moreover, as 
noted earlier, close observers regard the WRAP ini-
tiative as being the least credible of the three, and 
its certifications are unlikely to carry much weight 
when the agreement comes up for ratification.
Recognizing this, US retailer The Gap has been 
working  with  US-based  multinational  buyers  and 
producers in the Central American apparel sector to 
strengthen and expand private-sector initiatives to 
improve labor standards compliance. Ideas report-
edly under consideration include giving the ILO a 
prominent role, either in directly monitoring condi-
tions in the sector, as it is doing in Cambodia, or in 
accrediting the auditors that would do the monitor-
ing, or if the governments and the ILO cannot agree 
on the parameters for cooperation, creating a body 
with its own code and accreditation and monitoring 
procedures.
These are worthy ideas, but more results could 
be obtained with fewer resources if existing initia-
tives in three areas were strengthened: (1) providing 
more resources for training and certifying auditors, 
(2) mutual recognition among monitoring initiatives 
that meet minimum standards, and (3) transparen-
cy. Mutual recognition is needed to address reports 
of “monitoring fatigue” from factory managers who 
face demands from multiple buyers to comply with 
different codes and monitoring procedures that are 
not always consistent. The Gap–led coalition might 
consider contributing to a pilot program in Central 
America, like the one that the FLA, SAI, UK-based 
Ethical Trade Initiative, and other monitoring ini-
tiatives are working on in Turkey. This project is 
exploring  elements  of  a  common  code  and  best 
practices  in  monitoring  procedures  with  the  goal 
of moving toward mutual recognition of monitoring 
results.
However, transparency about conditions in fac-
tories is the key. The simplest and potentially most 
effective  initiative  that  the  business  community 
could promote would be to encourage all suppliers 
and buyers in the region to affiliate with one of the 
existing  code  initiatives, perhaps  including  WRAP 
if weaknesses in its code are rectified, and then to 
agree to allow factory reports to be published, as the 
ILO does under the monitoring program in Cambo-
dia. Transparency varies widely among the major 
code initiatives. The FLA publishes a global report 
9 The FLA is currently working with the Worker Rights Consor-
tium, which also conducts ad hoc investigations of alleged labor 
rights violations, and Notre Dame University to improve labor 
standards capacity in the region, including by trying to identify 
candidates for an ombudsman’s role in each of the five 
countries.
10 Interview at the labor ministry, San Jose, Costa Rica, October 
28, 2003.
Labor standards have been included in only 
a few US bilateral trade agreements. The 
jury is still out on whether the carrots and 
sticks included in these agreements are 
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that summarizes the status of working conditions in 
the supply chains of each of its member companies 
(based on external monitoring of only a fraction of 
suppliers in the chain), as well as “tracking reports” 
for each factory inspected that list problems found 
and remediation steps taken. These reports do not 
reveal the name and location of the suppliers, how-
ever, so that third parties cannot verify the reports. 
SAI takes the opposite approach, releasing lists of 
the names and addresses of certified facilities, along 
with  information  on  the  resolution  of  third-party 
complaints, but it does not release any reports on 
conditions or remediation efforts. WRAP provides no 
public information about the factories it certifies.
The transparency of ILO monitoring in Cambo-
dia tops them all. Initial reports identifying prob-
lems  with  labor  standards  compliance  are  given 
only to the factory manager, with suggestions for re-
mediation. A second inspection is done six months 
later,  and  a  report  is  released  to  the  public  that 
identifies by name and location the facilities visited 
and that shows what actions were taken to improve 
conditions and what problems remain. This model 
of maximum transparency, if the apparel sector or 
the business community in Central America were to 
adopt it more broadly, could have a powerful impact 
on the region.
Conclusion
Globalization is not leading to a worldwide race 
to the bottom for workers, but greater respect for 
the core labor standards could help spread its ben-
efits more broadly. Globalization and worker rights 
are complementary, not competing, ways of improv-
ing welfare. Ensuring that globalization and labor 
standards progress together requires a multifaceted 
approach, including a stronger and more effective 
ILO, more and better monitoring of corporate codes 
of conduct, and, in extreme cases, sanctions against 
egregious violations of worker rights. Trade agree-
ments can play a role in this by focusing attention 
on labor issues and by encouraging trading part-
ners to reform further. Number PB04-2 March 2004 11
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